

Taiwanese Nationalism: Problem for United States Policy

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Amidst the welter of proposals for the solution of the China problem—and the dearth of actual policy decisions—there has been general agreement in recent years that independence for Taiwan as a separate entity is a necessary part of any workable long-term plan. For example, Chester Bowles, writing in *Foreign Affairs* before the last presidential election,¹ set forth what he felt were the proper directions of United States China policy. He concluded, in part, "Formosa should remain a free entity and all its people should eventually be consulted as to its form of government." Though Mr. Bowles makes no such public statements these days, neither is there any explicit indication that on this point he has changed his mind. Many other well-informed private persons in the United States, as well as officials of friendly countries, have voiced similar opinions.

This position, based as it is on the right of self-determination of peoples, is commendable. But agreement on this goal does not extend to specific recommendations on how to achieve this result or even to predictions as to how it is likely to be achieved. In fact, despite spirited discussions in knowledgeable circles, very little speculation on this point has appeared in print.² Such public silence should end.

I

Present United States policy toward Taiwan seems to this observer to be one of drift. And if there is any direction at all, it is the result of the breeze created by Nationalist huffing and

puffing. Certainly there are no visible efforts to promote consultation with the Taiwanese people on their form of government. As we shall see, United States officials have not even been able to protect those who advocate such consultation from the fury of the Kuomintang police.

A policy of drift is not likely to produce a free and independent Taiwan. In fact, the chances are much greater that it will help to create a situation ripe for Communist success. This could come about in one of two ways: (1) a negotiated transfer of Taiwan to Peking's control, or (2) a forceful Communist take-over.

(1) Chiang Ching-kuo, the President's son, is a three-star general in the Nationalist army.³ Informed observers report that he is his father's first choice for his successor.⁴ Certainly his position as head of the secret police, of the KMT Youth Corps, and of the Chinese equivalent of the Veterans Administration contribute to his power. He is not liked, however, by the Kuomintang old guard or by senior army officers. This opposition may have contributed to a solution of the succession problem in 1960 by the Generalissimo succeeding himself. (On his demise, however, the solution will not be that simple.)

There is a widespread belief in Taiwan that Chiang Ching-kuo *wants* to succeed his father, and will stop at nothing—including a *coup d'état*—to achieve his ambition. This does not augur well for United States interests. Young Chiang is Moscow educated, has a Russian wife, and is presumed to be still a member of the Russian Communist Party, since he has never announced his resignation. He is well schooled in Communist Party methods, though he uses them now under the Kuomintang label. Most Taiwanese believe that were he to come to power he would make an arrangement with Mao Tse-tung which would peacefully bring Taiwan under Peking's dominion, and Chiang Ching-kuo a high position in Peking. Expert foreign opinion also counts this a possibility, though probability is extremely difficult to calculate. Whether or not this would happen, it is abundantly clear that under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership Taiwan's relations with the United States would be, at best, extremely difficult. Circumstantial evidence is strong that he

planned the sacking of the United States Embassy in Taipei in 1958—by an irate mob made up largely of members of his Youth Corps—as a deliberate embarrassment to the United States.

Perhaps an arrangement with Peking will not have to await the death of the elder Chiang. A London *Observer* story in August⁵ put into print what had earlier been only rumored, that is, that after years of negotiations in Hong Kong the Communists and the "Chiang family" had come to an agreement. The agreement reportedly provided that neither the Taipei nor the Peking regime would launch an attack against the other, but would maintain the status quo until President Chiang's death. After that Taiwan would become an "Autonomous Area" within the People's Republic, while the "Chiang family" maintained actual control. Ten to twenty years later a referendum would be held to determine Taiwan's future, whether it was to be an independent state or a part of China. ("The Chiang family" would be most meaningful if read "Chiang Ching-kuo.")

To the American ear this is a fantastic report. The Nationalist Government's reply, "ridiculous and impossible," "an absurd invention," is thus easily believed by many. We are quickly reminded of the kind of "autonomy" which exists in the Autonomous Area of Tibet. But the provisions of the agreement coincide to a remarkable extent with a proposal made more than a year ago by a responsible American scholar thoroughly acquainted with Chinese values and thought patterns. Though it is widely discredited, it is too simple to say that the report cannot be true.

(2) The second type of situation which could result from a policy of drift would involve more direct Communist action and different behavior by the Young Chiang. Let us assume that the forces opposed to Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan are strong enough to prevent his ascending the presidential chair on his father's death; the constitutional successor, Vice-President Chen Cheng, would take office instead. But he is also an elderly man, and ailing; his own succession might quickly pose a problem. In either case, the possibility of the Young Chiang and his supporters challenging a succession that by-passed him would be considerable. His struggle for power there would produce poli-

tical turmoil in Taiwan, perhaps even accompanied by internecine fighting. The most militant Taiwanese nationalists would rise, thus creating the very crisis that the Communists have been waiting for. Even a small group of Communists who could seize a radio station, or set up their own, and then broadcast an invitation to Red forces on the mainland might provide circumstances sufficiently propitious to create the probability of Communist invasion. If the Communists were able temporarily to identify with the Taiwanese, United States forces might fall into the trap of supporting Chiang. Despite United States military strength, an island in revolt against America's ally could hardly be defended against Communist invasion.

Thus, it should be clear that the juridical myths and political hallucinations on which the Kuomintang regime is built inevitably create a weak and uncertain ally for the United States. The insistence of Generalissimo Chiang that Mao is correct when he declares that Taiwan is an integral part of China, or when he proclaims that there is now and always will be but one Central Flowery Kingdom, is linked to his fanciful dream that he will one day return to reconquer the mainland. For a country of nearly 11 million to support the legal basis for its forceful annexation by a powerful neighbor of 600 million is risky business indeed. Yet this is the government which is supposed to provide the central link in the American chain of defense in the Far East. We are courting disaster.

The Nationalist regime on Taiwan suffers from still another fatal weakness. It lacks the support—rather it faces the hostility—of the people it rules. More than 9 million native-born Taiwanese are showing themselves to be increasingly dissatisfied with the political machine brought to their island from the mainland. Kuomintang repression has had to become increasingly overt. This does not bring political stability to the land, neither does it earn the title "Free China." Thus, whether viewed from the standpoint of military strategy or political principle, there is very little, if anything, in the policies of the current Taipeh government, which coincides with the best interests of the United States. Only a regime which has the wholehearted support of the inhabitants and which legally and politically defends Taiwan's

freedom from all outside control] is a true ally of the United States. Such a regime would be one responsive to the needs and representative of the desires of the Taiwanese people. Is such a regime merely a fond hope, or is it an inevitable reality? Though it is not as inevitable as some persons contend, it is certainly possible, given the appropriate United States policies.

II

What are the needs and desires of the Taiwanese people? They are both economic and political. Economically, Taiwan has made very substantial progress in the last decade. According to official government figures the growth rate of the economy has been second only to the Japanese record. Clearly, per capita income rose in the same period, despite the frightening population increase of over 3.5 per cent per annum, higher than that of any other East Asian country.⁶ Industry has grown faster than other segments of the economy. Truly economic progress has been remarkable, and the more than \$2 billion of United States economic aid is in large part responsible.

But there are important qualifications that must be made to this glowing account which will help us to understand better the aspirations of the Taiwanese. Much of the progress was merely devoted to restoring the conditions which had existed in 1945, before the coming of the disastrous Kuomintang carpetbag regime. Average per capita income did not reach pre-war levels until the mid-1950's. Insofar as the Nationalist Government aided the Taiwanese people, it was merely returning what it had once taken from them. The second qualification which must be entered is that despite the progress which has taken place, it is the Taiwanese view that too much capital was diverted to the support of an unnecessarily large armed force, funds which could have been used for even faster economic growth.

Furthermore, in the last few years the rate of economic growth may actually have decreased. Rates of increase in agricultural production have clearly slowed, so that Taiwan will probably be forced to import rice in the near future. Recently, some members of the Legislative Yuan⁷ have impugned government statistics. They charged that contrary to official reports, Taiwan's

economy was "actually deteriorating." Since high growth rates have become such important weapons in the arsenal of political propaganda, the temptation to magnify progress would certainly be very great. But if such magnification has taken place, it will have impressed foreigners, not Taiwanese. In any case, official figures admit a declining rate of growth in per capita income. Rapid growth has created expectation of future rapid growth. Even though growth continues, if the rates decrease, the seeds of economic dissatisfaction have been planted. The individual is given a sense of retarded progress which is conducive to political unrest.

Politically, Taiwanese want personal freedom, self-government, and the right to determine their own future. They have enjoyed none of these. The story of the Taiwanese struggle for political freedom and its consistent suppression by the Kuomintang regime is not well known, so that perhaps it should be summarized here.

The first period of Kuomintang rule was the worst. In 1945 the Chinese government treated Taiwan like captured enemy territory, rather than liberated homeland. A voracious warlord, General Chen Yi, was sent as governor. He and his henchmen embarked on systematic plunder of the economy, for example, forcing the sale of raw materials and consumer goods at low prices, then selling them on the mainland at fantastic profits, removing machinery from factories for export, ripping sewer pipes from the streets and light fixtures from unguarded houses.⁸ Formosan businessmen suffered from enormous "squeeze." Food prices rose by more than 500 per cent in a year. Any attempt to protest was ruthlessly suppressed. Finally, by February 1947 "Formosans found themselves . . . infinitely worse off than they had been under the Japanese . . ."⁹ A revolutionary situation had been created; all that was needed was a spark.

On the evening of February 27 police and Monopoly Bureau agents in Taipei beat a woman to death for allegedly selling untaxed cigarettes. An angry mob then set upon the agents, who shot at random, killing one person.¹⁰ The next day an orderly crowd, marching to present a petition of protest to the governor, was again fired upon and four died. This set off a bitter outburst

throughout the city against mainland Chinese. The military responded by engaging in indiscriminate firing. By March 2, a committee of respected and conservative Formosan leaders was formed which began negotiations with the governor and thus helped to quiet the situation. Despite strong pressures for more extreme action, the committee presented to the governor a petition for reform, asking for greater local autonomy, personal freedom, and economic reform "in order to hasten Dr. Sun Yat-sen's program of National Reconstruction." This was not a separatist movement. The next morning a government representative described the demands for reform as "very proper" and promised that no troops would be brought from the mainland. Actually, that very evening 10,000 troops and police were landed in Keelung; thereafter followed unprecedented slaughter. Since we tend to forget these things, it would be well to quote the eyewitness report of an American official: "Beginning March 9, there was widespread indiscriminate killing. Soldiers were seen bayonetting coolies without apparent provocation. . . . Young Formosan men were observed tied together, being prodded at bayonet point toward the city limits . . . Looting began wherever the soldiers saw something desirable." A systematic search was begun for middle-school students, editors, lawyers, prominent businessmen, and anyone identified in any way with the former Committee for Settlement. Schoolteachers began to disappear on March 14. "After three days in Taipei, government forces began to push out into suburban and rural areas. Mounted machine gun patrols were observed along the highroads 15 to 20 miles from Taipei shooting at random in village streets." Officials estimate that about 10,000 persons died. The bitterness retained by surviving witnesses of this slaughter is understandably deep and strong. (The parallels with Hungary are remarkable.)

General Chen Yi was removed in April, but never reprimanded. Not until General Chen Cheng arrived on the island in 1949 were reforms instituted.

One of the reforms for which the Kuomintang has been lavishly praised, the land reform, fulfilled more purposes than just "land to the landless." David Rowe, frequent defender of the Nationalist regime, admits that "land reform in Taiwan

effectively broke the power of the gentry in the Taiwan countryside. . . ."¹¹ The task begun by Chen Yi, the elimination of all potential Taiwanese leadership, was completed.

The combination of bloody repression, economic attack on traditional rural leaders, and general economic progress succeeded in quieting any Taiwanese who might have had political ambitions. For several years there was little Taiwanese political activity, at least in Taiwan. Martial law, permitting raids and secret trials, discouraged it. The situation was so quiet, in fact, that one author, a former State Department official, could write a whole book about Formosa in late 1952 without making mention of the political role or aspirations of the Taiwanese.¹²

There was some activity abroad, however. The Communists who were able to escape after February 27, went to Hong Kong. There, in collaboration with the anti-Kuomintang Democratic League, they organized a Formosan League for Democratic Self-Government.¹³ In 1949 they followed the Democratic League to Peking. They would undoubtedly play some role in the event of Communist "liberation" of Taiwan.

Non-Communist Taiwanese nationalist leaders fled first to Shanghai, and then with the Communist advance, to Hong Kong and to Tokyo. The first major statement of these elements was a manifesto issued in Tokyo in August 1948, demanding Formosan independence and signed by ten leaders claiming to represent as many groups.¹⁴ Dr. Thomas Liao, signing for the Formosan League for Re-emancipation, headed the list. In 1950, Dr. Liao's brother, Joshua, published a pamphlet in Hong Kong entitled *Formosa Speaks*, explaining the Taiwanese Nationalist position.¹⁵ Declared Liao, "With their group-consciousness growing into Formosan Nationalism, neither Chinese-made nor Japanese-imported, the Formosan Patriots want to regain political independence through a plebiscite under neutral supervision, failing which recourse to arms will be the only alternative."

The most dramatic move by the exiled independence movement was the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa on February 28, 1956, also in Tokyo. Dr. Thomas Liao, son of a wealthy Taiwanese family who had received his Ph.D. in chemistry from Ohio State University in

1935, was elected president by the 24-man "National Assembly." The National Assembly itself had been formed the year before by persons claiming to be representatives of the 24 prefectures in Taiwan. Some were actually recent political refugees from Taiwan, while others had been residents of Japan since before the war. This Provisional Government purported to have the backing of the entire Taiwanese community of 20,000, but the claim was undoubtedly exaggerated. It did get some financial support, however, from Taiwanese businessmen, which facilitated organizational and propaganda activity.¹⁶

Though establishment of a provisional government was a dramatic move, it was incapable of casting the Taiwanese independence movement as a major figure on the world stage. There was no evidence that Chiang Kai-shek was anxious for his throne or that Washington policymakers took any account of the movement in their calculations. Dr. Liao, a self-admitted romanticist, was not made of the hardbitten stuff of a Syngman Rhee. He was apparently unable either to exercise any influence over foreign embassies or to stimulate the formation of an underground movement in Taiwan. Nevertheless, he has several times been refused a United States visa.

Though by 1958 anti-Chinese sentiment inside Taiwan had gradually become more widespread, it still had no evident organizational expression. Foreign correspondents who provided elaborate protection for their informant's anonymity could hear a variety of complaints of economic discrimination and political restrictions.¹⁷ But the main complaint was simply lack of self-government. Though city and *hsien* officers and Provincial Assembly members are popularly elected, candidates are well screened, and the Kuomintang almost always wins. (In April 1960 elections KMT candidates won 92 of 94 posts at stake.)¹⁸ Taiwanese businessmen who refused invitations to join the KMT were subject to economic harassment. Thus, even though most government offices below the provincial governor were filled by Taiwanese, this by no means signified self-rule.

The governor, much more powerful than the Provincial Assembly, was until December 1962 General Chow, a mainlander appointed by Generalissimo Chiang.

Governor Chow, a dynamic and ambitious man, fully recognized the power potential in his control of provincial government machinery. Realizing that Vice-President Chen was sickly and General Chiang Ching-Kuo, unpopular, Chow—according to one account—apparently began to imagine himself a possible successor to the Generalissimo and attempted to mold the provincial KMT as his instrument.¹⁹ In the fall of 1962 he arrested certain KMT officials in Chia-I Hsien for corruption. Since these were Chiang Ching-Kuo's men, this was Chow's last mistake. By the end of November the Generalissimo had removed him. General Huang Chieh, former commander of Nationalist troops in Burma, is the new governor; he acts largely as an agent of the Young Chiang. The locus of power in the provincial government has been clarified.

The proportion of Taiwanese representation in the national government finds justification only in the fiction that Taiwan is but one province of China. Two cabinet members, five out of 88 members of the Control Yuan, eight out of 508 members of the Legislative Yuan and 26 out of 1,576 members of the National Assembly are Taiwanese.²⁰ In the 15-man Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang two Taiwanese hold seats. It is the Party and the National Government which set economic policy, direct the secret police, etc. In these matters Taiwanese feel they have no voice. Those Taiwanese who are members of national bodies are usually not trusted by their countrymen; they are often persons who have spent many years on the mainland. Even when this is not the case, they are still viewed as "collaborators" by many Formosans.

Despite widespread dissatisfaction, however, Denis Warner, an acutely observant Australian journalist, found in the fall of 1958 that "Though they are vaguely aware of the existence of an independence movement, people are confused and uncertain."

III

By 1960 this situation had changed. Taiwanese nationalists had become more bold, more desperate, and better organized, both at home and abroad. The success of a spontaneous revolt in throwing off the Rhee regime, a close ally of Chiang Kai-shek

which had been depicted in Taiwan as a pillar of anti-Communist strength, had a profound impact on people's thinking. It caused oppositionists to re-examine their own potentialities. Furthermore, thirteen years after the 1947 massacre a new generation of leaders had grown up, recalling the horror of March, but less fearful of action than their seniors. Insofar as economic dissatisfaction was growing, a mass base for political protest was provided.

The first effort to break the surface was the attempt to form the China Democratic Party. One responsible American observer wrote from Taiwan late in May 1960: "A deep gulf separates Taiwanese and mainlander. . . . While there are no signs of an organized resistance movement, many Taiwanese subscribe to the increasingly open sentiment of 'Taiwan for the Taiwanese.'" However, increased political opportunities for Taiwanese and "continued prosperity it is felt, will probably rule out any serious effort at direct action by the Taiwanese."²¹ But the signs he did not see soon appeared. Two weeks later, just before President Eisenhower's arrival in Taiwan, seven Taiwanese officials and professional men issued a statement protesting against dictatorial tendencies in government. In late July there was an all-day riot by several hundred persons in a southern Taiwan town to protest reports of irregularities in the April mayoralty election,²² exactly the kind of disturbances which sparked the April revolution in Korea.

Thus, in August, when Taiwanese opposition leaders publicly announced their intention of launching a new political party, the China Democratic Party, the Nationalist Government's reaction was understandably sharp. The KMT newspaper immediately branded the new party's leaders "underworld characters." Five days after this announcement the most prominent member of the provisional executive committee of the party, and the only mainland Chinese in their number, Lei Chen, was arrested. Lei Chen, editor of *Free China Fortnightly* was one of Taiwan's leading intellectuals. At first the most serious charge was that in his magazine he had declared that return to the mainland was "hopeless" and had "implied the possibility of a *coup d'état*."²³ Later, the main charge was that he had knowingly

sheltered on his staff a Communist spy. The Government denied that Lei Chen's arrest was in any way connected with plans for formation of the China Democratic Party, a denial which was publicly questioned in the Legislative Yuan.²⁴

In the one day of public trial, Lei Chen declared that he had not known that one of his staff was a Communist spy. Nevertheless he was convicted by the military tribunal and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He immediately appealed. While the appeal was pending the government was acutely embarrassed by the return to Taiwan of Hu Shih, former Chinese ambassador to the United States, and since deceased. Dr. Hu declared that Lei Chen was a "true patriot" and that he (Hu) was "convinced that he was not guilty of sedition" as charged.²⁵ But the conviction and sentence were upheld by the review court. After the conviction was final the government was again criticized, this time by the Control Yuan, which set up a five-man committee to investigate the case. (Mrs. Lei is a Control Yuan member.)²⁶ But Lei Chen is still in jail.

The only appearance of "concessions" to be made by the regime was a 26-point resolution of the KMT Central Executive Committee released in October. This proclaimed "sweeping political, economic and educational reforms," for example, support for economic development plans, extension of social security, greater budgetary efficiency, revival of Chinese virtues in education, and "better discipline" of KMT members of the Legislative Yuan!²⁷ A different kind of concession was the election of General Huang Kuo-shu, a Taiwanese, as president of the Legislative Yuan in February 1961. However, since General Huang has spent a large part of his life on the mainland, many do not consider him a true Taiwanese. This "concession" was no more meaningful than the others.

Taiwanese members of the China Democratic Party executive committee had not been arrested, a commendably skillful tactic. Kao Yu-chu, former mayor of Taipei, bravely announced that party leaders would go ahead with plans to organize chapters throughout the island. But the Party's plans did not, in fact, prosper. Police restraint when handling big-name Taiwanese did not extend to activities in the countryside. In September a party

leader in Yunlin and member of the *hsien* council, Su Tung-chi, was arrested on charges of treason; he was said to have been plotting to overthrow the government. In May 1962 news leaked out that Su, a Taiwanese, had been convicted by a secret court-martial and condemned to death.²⁸ According to reports, 44 others were convicted with him and two other death sentences handed down.

The Taiwanese independence movement in Tokyo claims Mr. Su as its hero. Certainly, his arrest and death sentence mark the beginning of a new period in Taiwanese politics. While denying that he had been planning a *coup d'état*, Tokyo spokesmen do contend that he was a leader in the growing underground independence movement in Taiwan. At the same time they admit a "lamentable" lack of coordination between this movement and Taiwanese nationalist organizations overseas.

What was, in fact, Su's role? Exiled nationalists may be overly cautious in their explanation. Some observers who were in Taiwan believe that there was a *coup d'état* plan drawn up by young Taiwanese army officers of which Su Tung-chi had knowledge. Su's secret trial and execution was official recognition of his importance, these observers contend, as was the unusually vigorous "Anti-Communist Self-Examination Movement," officially launched in early 1962. Informers were promised financial reward and high-school students warned that those who failed to report incriminating information were subject to court-martial. Actually, the "Movement" was designed to expose secret Taiwanese nationalist organizations. By April, the government reported that "several hundred" persons had "voluntarily surrendered."²⁹ By 1962 the independence movement had become much more than "vague awareness" in the minds of the Taiwanese people.

IV

The situation among overseas organizations has also changed since 1958. Dr. Liao's Provisional Government is no longer the dominant group. Formosan students have assumed a more active role. In the United States student groups consolidated to form the United Formosans for Independence in 1961. Their headquarters is in Philadelphia, where they publish a monthly, *Itha*

Formosa. Their task is to educate the American public to the rightness of their cause. Their original platform was independence through the holding of an United Nation-supervised plebescite,⁵⁰ though they now admit that revolution may be necessary.⁵¹

In Tokyo, a militant student organization called *Taiwan Chinglian* or *Taiwan Seinen* (Taiwan Youth) has been active since 1960. They publish a monthly magazine by this name in Japanese and began putting out an English quarterly in mid-1962. These youths were not satisfied to remain within Dr. Liao's fold for several reasons. Being younger they are more activist and were dissatisfied with Liaco's slower pace. Since most of them have come from Taiwan more recently than those in the Provisional Government, they have a better feel for current political realities and are not in a mood to accept advice from their elders. Lacking an American education and reflecting the growing disillusionment in Taiwan with American policy, they are highly critical of what they believe to be Dr. Liao's overdependence on American initiative. *Taiwan Seinen* members have been heard to remark derisively that Dr. Liao is waiting for an American battleship to take him back to Formosa. They maintain that Taiwanese must rely on their own abilities, that the United States is very uncertain help in time of trouble. Consequently, they are willing to admit openly the probable necessity for an armed revolt, an admission Dr. Liao seldom makes, an exigency he does not plan for.

V

What indeed are the chances of revolt or *coup d'état* by Taiwanese nationalists? Chiang Kai-shek unquestionably fears one; his policies reveal it. Increasingly, Taiwanese are thinking about and even planning for one. With a growing per cent of Taiwanese in the armed forces, they must be assigned with care to forestall any possible political role. Formosans now comprise nearly 60 per cent of the 600,000-man military establishment.⁵² But since mainlanders are older, a much larger majority of combat effectives are Formosans. Nearly three-fourths of the troops on Quemoy are Formosans, however, so that more than one-fourth of all

Taiwanese in uniform are removed from the political scene. Furthermore, the air force and the armored corps are manned almost entirely by mainlanders.

There are very few Taiwanese officers above the rank of captain, and most of these are again persons who spent a long time on the mainland, often in the service of the Nationalist government. These older officers are not likely to play a leadership role. On the other hand, there are many Taiwanese with rank of captain or lieutenant, both regulars—about 20 per cent of the students in the Military Academy are now Taiwanese—and those serving on ROTC duty. Elaborate precautions are taken, however, to forestall political activity. Taiwanese company commanders are usually assigned an executive officer from the mainland. Lieutenants are watched by Chiang Ching-kuo's ubiquitous political commissars. Special efforts are made to prevent Taiwanese officers from getting too close to their men. It would seem reasonable to predict, therefore, that any attempted coup begun at the company commander level today would probably fail, as events of 1961 seem to have corroborated. Furthermore, one gets the impression that civilian underground organizations are at present not sufficiently coordinated to be able to give instantaneous island-wide support to any coup attempt. And so long as a majority of well-armed troops within Taiwan are mainlanders, any revolt begun by civilian groups could probably be put down.

Within less than a decade, however, the march of time will have substantially altered the ethnic makeup of the army. Most of the conditions which cause us now to predict failure for any attempt will no longer obtain. But even if these means were effective, they are not appropriate for achieving the democratic end of self-determination. Whenever peaceful political methods are real alternatives, United States policy must foster *them*, not military action. In any case, to wait nearly a decade for satisfaction of Taiwanese political aspirations is dangerous, and risks the turn of events set forth above. A solution of the problem in keeping with our political principles and our national interests must be found within the next few years, at most.

Nor is the only danger of delay the possible loss of the island

to the Communists. If we procrastinate long enough in the making of constructive new policy, we will find that we are disliked equally by all parties to the dispute. The waning of good will for America among Taiwanese has already been noted by several commentators. The Taiwanese themselves have been most polite. Says Khu Eng-han, a Taiwanese writer in Tokyo, "There are not a few Formosans who place much of the blame [for the present situation in Formosa] on the... policy of the United States Government."³³ Professor Scalapino has posed the problem more squarely: "We shall either develop a China policy that includes the principle that all citizens of Taiwan shall have a voice in determining their future and participating in their government or we shall ultimately face the hostility of the Taiwanese people themselves."³⁴ The United States could not well afford inaction in another case like that of Lei's or Su's.

VI

What then should United States policy be? Positive steps at an early date will be necessary to ensure both a stable and friendly government on Taiwan. A gradual and peaceful transfer to Taiwanese hands is by no means inevitable. For years the Kuomintang regime has recognized the Taiwanese desire for self-government and self-determination, but no real power has been transferred to them above the *hsien* level, and even in the *hsien* restrictions are considerable. One might almost say that the more inevitable Taiwanese political dominance appears, the more resistant to change the Kuomintang becomes. To bring about peaceful change, strong outside pressure on the regime will be necessary. The United States, which defends the country, balances its budget, and maintains its prosperity, can exert that pressure. Not to do so is indefensible irresponsibility. Our support for Chiang today is already from the Formosan view "interference in the internal affairs of Taiwan."

It would appear logical in the present situation to apply pressure first for democratization of provincial government. (Open support for exiled independence groups would brand them as American tools and thus defeat their purposes, besides putting a very severe strain on Washington-Taipei relations.)

The minimum demand for democratization of provincial government would be direct election of the governor and transfer to him of control over the police. Both presentation of candidacies and voting processes would, of course, have to be free and honest. A freely elected governor would clearly be the political leader of the Taiwanese people and could thus, with this power base, bargain for the gradual transfer of national government functions to the provincial administration. Self-determination would be expressed progressively and tacitly. No change in the international legal status of Formosa during President Chiang's lifetime need be made, but in the inevitable factional struggles at his death the strongest faction to emerge would, of necessity, be the Formosan people, led by their popularly elected chief executive.

The political arguments which could be used to suspend "temporarily" the constitutional limitation on the president's term do not apply to provincial administration. The return-to-the-mainland psychosis may determine the form and processes of the "national" government, but it should not and must not be allowed to thwart democracy at the provincial level, and if the discussion were brought into the open, it need not. The issue is important enough that the United States, if rebuffed privately, must be willing to make the request publicly. It must also be willing to suspend all aid pending Kuomintang announcement of the reforms requested.

Some will say that suspension of aid, military as well as economic, would open Taiwan to the threat of Communist invasion. It is difficult to support this position, however. In the first place, a suspension of a few months, which would probably be sufficient to bring changes in Kuomintang policy, would not substantially weaken Nationalist forces. Furthermore, the United States Seventh Fleet and United States air power are undoubtedly a greater deterrent to Communist action than Chiang's army. The Nationalist army today is a much more effective instrument for imposing an unwanted regime on the Taiwanese people than it is for defending the country against Communism.

Thus, withholding of military aid should be thought of not only as a tactic to encourage particular reforms. Substantial reduction of military assistance in the long-run will not only

save United States taxpayers money, but will, by gradually weakening the instrument for controlling the populace, force the regime to be more sensitive to popular demands. Even United States aid officials have criticized Chiang's unnecessarily heavy military expenditures.³⁵

Such a policy will be followed only if the United States Government recognizes that "Taiwan for the Taiwanese" is not just an idealistic slogan, but is the necessary basis for action which can preserve in the long-run both American and "Free World" interests in Taiwan. It would stir up hornet's nests of criticism, and produce small, but manageable, crises. A policy of drift is, on the other hand, presently painless; but, like a slow growing cancer, it ultimately destroys its host. Let us choose the operation.

NOTES

1. Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, (Apr. 1960), p. 486.
2. Perhaps the best analysis is Urban Whittaker, "The United Nations and the Future of Formosa," *Ilha Formosa*, 1:1 (Jan. 1965), pp. 5-8.
3. *New York Times*, July 20, 1960.
4. See for instance John Ma, "Will Chiang Step Down," *New Republic* (Feb. 8, 1960), pp. 14-16.
5. *London Observer*, August 12, 1962.
6. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *The Population of SE Asia* (New York, 1958).
7. *New York Times*, April 22, 1961.
8. George Kerr, "Formosa's Return to China," *Far Eastern Survey* (Oct. 15, 1947), p. 206.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
10. "Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan, Annex 159," *United States Relations with China*, Department of State Publication 3573, 1949, p. 926 ff.
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14. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
15. Author's Preface reprinted in *ibid.*, Appendix Five.
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